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ABSTRACT 
The study investigates the impact of media coverage of protest on issue attention in 
parliament (questions) in six Western-European countries. Integrating several 
datasets on protest, media and political agendas, we demonstrate that media 
coverage of protest affects parliamentary agendas: the more media attention 
protest on an issue receives, the more parliamentary questions on that issue are 
asked. The relationship, however, is mediated by the issue agenda of mass media 
more generally, attesting to an indirect rather than a direct effect. Additionally, the 
effect of media-covered protests on the general media agenda is moderated by the 
political system and is larger in majoritarian countries than in countries with a 
consensus democracy. This shows the importance of political opportunity structures 
for the agenda-setting impact of protest. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Does protest matter? The question is simple but the answer complex. It depends on 
what kind of effect one is talking about, on the type of protest, and on the precise 
circumstances in which the protest takes place. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
effect of protest probably is—at least from a political perspective—its most 
important aspect, empirical studies that have tackled the matter have reached 
mixed conclusions (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999; Uba 2009). To take a step 
forward, this study deals with one specific type of impact: the political agenda effect 
of protest. More concretely, we investigate the effect of mass media coverage of 
protest on parliamentary questions asked by members of parliament. Does coverage 
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of protest events in the mass media lead to a subsequent increase of attention to 
the underlying issues on the political agenda? 
The number of studies employing an agenda-setting framework to analyze 
the effect of protest has remained limited (for an overview see AUTHORS 2012). One 
of the key issues we know particularly little about is the precise mechanism 
connecting street protest with issue attention by institutional political actors. Mass 
media coverage is an obvious candidate for playing a mediating role: protest leads to 
media coverage of protest events which leads to media coverage of issues relating to 
the protest more widely which leads to politics. But the importance of the mass 
media in the effect of protest on political issue attention has remained unclear. 
While mass media are seen as a major forum for public debate and information-
sharing and are, theoretically, considered as a crucial factor for conveying 
movements’ claims (Koopmans 2004; Ferree et al. 2002), it is uncertain to what 
extent mass media attention indeed acts as a factor mediating the political agenda-
setting effect of protest. 
Largely from the US, most ‘protest-and-agenda’-studies have found protest 
(or the presence of social movements) to affect the political agenda. When protest 
activity relating to an issue increases, political elites start to devote more attention 
to that issue. Whereas it seems obvious that the impact of protest differs across 
nations—a vast social movement and protest literature has shown that the political 
context matters a great deal (see for example: Kriesi et al. 1995)—not a single 
agenda study has adopted a comparative framework and analyzed the effect of 
protest across countries. In sum, we do not really know whether the impact of 
protest on the political agenda is direct or rather mediated by the issue attention of 
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the mass media, and we lack basic information about the influence of protest cross-
nationally. 
This paper tackles these two matters. We focus on the intermediary role 
played by the mass media and we compare outcomes across countries. Our results 
show that the direct, unmediated effect of media-protest coverage on the political 
agenda is absent. There is an effect of protest but it is fully mediated by the issue 
attention of general mass media coverage. The mechanism of influence is as follows: 
Protest events results in media coverage of those events which leads to increased 
mass media attention to the underlying issue and this, in turn, affects which issues 
political elites are addressing in parliament. In other words, the news media play a 
dual mediating role: (1) the media cover protest events and (2), as a consequence, 
increase their attention for the underlying issue in their general (non-protest) 
coverage. Second, for the first time applying an agenda-setting approach to protest 
outcomes in a comparative design (six countries), we find protest to matter 
(indirectly, via the media) for the political agenda in most countries. Yet, there are 
some notable differences across countries depending on their political system. 
Protest matters less in countries with a so-called ‘consensus’ democracy compared 
to a ‘majoritarian’ democracy.  
 
THE ISSUE ATTENTION EFFECT OF PROTEST 
 
In a recent study, Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2012) present an overview of extant 
work implicitly or explicitly drawing on the agenda-setting perspective to assess the 
impact of protest. They found eleven such studies published from 1978-2010 in 
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major sociology or political science journals (Burstein and Freudenberg 1978; Costain 
and Majstorovic 1994; Soule et al. 1999; McAdam and Su 2002; Baumgartner and 
Mahoney 2005; King et al. 2005; Soule and King 2006; King et al. 2007; Johnson 
2008; Olzak and Soule 2009; Johnson et al. 2010). Some of this work holds that 
protest is especially effective early on in the political cycle (King et al. 2005; Soule 
and King 2006), others find that protest is a consequence of political attention rather 
than a cause (Soule et al. 1999), but most of these studies show that protest, or 
social movement activity more generally, matters somehow for what issues political 
institutions devote attention to. 
 Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in attention for issues on 
policy agendas as a key aspect in studying dynamics in the political process. 
Attention by political actors is a necessary condition for policy change (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). The process of agenda setting captures the transfer of salience 
from one policy agenda to another agenda and is key in understanding shifts in 
attention and, ultimately, policy change. For a social movement to reach its political 
goals, it is thus a necessary step to be able to exert influence on the agenda of those 
institutional actors with actual decision power. Agenda setting offers a clear 
theoretical approach to look at the effectiveness of protest: does an increase in 
protest activity on a certain issue result in an increase of political attention for the 
same issue?  
The most glaring weakness of the literature on political outcomes of protest 
more generally and on the agenda effect in particular is its non-comparative nature. 
In a recent overview of political outcomes studies more globally, Amenta et al. 
(2010, p. 295) state that there have been very few comparative studies (see also: 
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Bosi and Uba 2009). Many studies assessing the political impact of movements or 
mobilization are case studies with a narrow empirical scope. With just a handful of 
exceptions (see for example: Linders 2004; Giugni 2004; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009), 
most studies deal with one case, one movement, one policy field, or even one single 
decision. In her review of 74 that focus on political outcomes of social movements, 
Uba (2009) classified virtually all studies under one single policy issue. Only eight of 
the 74 studies compare across countries. This thwarts the possibility for developing a 
cumulative body of evidence with robust generalizations about when movements 
and their activities matter (Giugni 2004; Bosi and Uba 2009). The studies focusing 
specifically on agenda-setting suffer from the same weakness. Some studies did 
compare across several US states (see: King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Soule and 
King 2006) but none adopted a cross-national perspective and all are US studies. The 
reason for the absence of cross-national work is the lack of comparable cross-
national data (Amenta et al., 2010, p. 295). 
An agenda approach to protest impact solves some of the methodological 
and empirical problems that Amenta and colleagues signal. The major advantage of 
the agenda approach is that it ‘standardizes’ the measures of the independent 
(protest) and dependent variables (political agenda). In doing so, the approach 
solves the cross-national measurement problem. The unit of analyses is the 
attention to a given issue during a specific time period. In the end, this approach 
allows for comparisons of the effect of protest (i) across political issues, (ii) over a 
long period of time, and (iii) across countries. 
Regarding the mechanism of influence, many movement scholars claim that 
mass media are crucial for social movements and protest politics. It has been argued 
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that media create ‘discursive opportunities’ that are needed to spread the 
movement word. If a movement and its protest are not covered, it basically does not 
exist (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). In this spirit, Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld (1993, p. 116) even state that a protest event “with no media coverage at 
all is a non-event.” Yet, the crucial question of how the broader issue agenda of mass 
media relates to protest impact and whether it acts as an intermediary factor has 
hardly been investigated empirically. To the best of our knowledge, only one study 
has tackled this question directly (Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). To be sure, 
there is some work, both theoretical and empirical, on other intermediary factors 
apart from the media. For example, students of social movements have examined 
the effect of protest on public opinion and so, indirectly, on political elites’ actions 
(see for example: Terkildsen and Schnell 1997; McAdam and Su 2002; Costain and 
Majstorovic 1994). And, there is a large body of literature on how the political 
effects of protest are mediated by political allies in the political system—only when 
institutional actors see benefit in aiding the protesters is there a political outcome 
(see the work by Amenta and for example: Amenta, Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992). 
However, work which systematically scrutinizes the mediating role of mass media is 
exceedingly rare. 
Before formulating concrete hypotheses, we need to address a 
straightforward question: Why would political elites turn to issues that have been 
the object of protest in the first place? Our basic assumption is that protest, via its 
coverage in the media, provides information to elites about problems in society 
(Burstein 1999; Lohmann 1993). Protest is a signal that (some) people are 
dissatisfied with a certain state of affairs and/or with an expected change of the 
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status quo. Protest events that receive at least minimal media attention indicate a 
level of social concern with a particular cause or issue. In many cases, protest and its 
coverage in the news media signals that (a segment of) the public demands political 
elites to act on an issue to solve a problem (policy change). Since politics is the 
business of solving problems in line with the preferences of the public (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2009) politicians and political institutions tend to react to 
such incoming signals. The particular attractiveness of the protest signal for political 
elites, and where it differs from media coverage in general, is that it not only hints at 
the fact that some people are dissatisfied, but also gives an indication about how 
many people care about the problem and to what extent they care about it. The 
protest coverage signal has a number of features that make it specifically noticeable 
for political elites: it is public and accessible, negative, most of the time 
unambiguous, with a clear evaluative slant, applicable to one’s task, and (for some 
elites) compatible with existing predispositions. Although there are inherent and 
documented biases in which protests secure media coverage (Earl, Martin, 
McCarthy, & Soule, 2004), those protest events which sufficiently disrupt the media 
agenda to gain attention provide a signal to political elites of the societal importance 
of issues. 
A large literature has showed that protest is a particularly costly way for 
people to let their voice be heard; protest requires time, effort, resources and skills 
(see for example in the broader political participation literature: Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Tilly (2006) says that protest has 
political impact—in this case: affects the political agenda—when it displays, what he 
calls, ‘WUNC’. This is an acronym referring to worthiness, unity, numbers and 
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commitment. The more WUNC, the larger the impact. The more people show up and 
the more they are committed (and united), the larger the chance that they will take 
into account their dissatisfaction regarding the issue when voting next time. So 
ultimately, as also Lohmann (1993) says, protest is about an electoral threat (see 
also: Burstein 1999; Burstein and Linton 2002; Uba 2009). Building on the general 
idea that protest and its coverage in the news media forms an informative signal for 
political elites and that the features of the signal and of the receiver determine 
whether the signal will be picked up we develop a number of specific hypotheses. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The first and most straightforward expectation that follows from the above is that 
protest coverage in the mass media matters and leads to a subsequent increase of 
attention for the protest issue by political elites. Quite a number of studies have 
found protest to have an agenda effect (see for example: Burstein and Freudenberg 
1978; McAdam and Su 2002; King, Bentele, and Soule 2007; Johnson et al. 2010; 
Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). Koopmans’ theory of discursive opportunities 
(2004) emphasizes the importance of news coverage for protest events to exert any 
type of political influence. Only via the mass media does protest affect elite 
behavior. The entire interaction between social movements and political elites, says 
Koopmans, takes place not as real-life encounters but rather through the claims 
made in the mass media. There is no other way for most elites to get to know about 
protest than via the media. Since some scholars have claimed that protest matters in 
particular early on in the policy cycle (Soule and King 2006), we focus here on 
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parliamentary questions, which can be argued to occur early in the policy process 
and to be a response by politicians that is not severely limited by institutional 
constraints (Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). Therefore we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: News coverage of protest leads to more subsequent parliamentary 
questioning about the issue underlying the protest. 
Most studies dealing with the political agenda impact of protest did not control for 
general (non-protest) media coverage, nor did they test the potentially intermediary 
role of such general media coverage. We hold that at least a part of the issue 
attention effect of protest coverage is actually generated by increasing media 
attention to the protest issue more generally. Media coverage of the protest event 
triggers media attention to the underlying issue, and this media attention has a 
subsequent effect on the political agenda. That the issue agenda of the news media 
affects the political agenda is by now a well-established fact (see for example: 
Vliegenthart et al. 2016; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). That protest may lead 
to media attention as well (see for example: Smith et al. 2001; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver 
and Maney 2000). It therefore seems logical to expect that a part of the effect of 
protest coverage on the political agenda runs via the issue agenda of the mass media 
more generally. The question is how much of the protest effect is mediated by 
general news coverage. 
Taking Koopmans’ account on the importance of media for protest one step 
further suggests that full mediation takes place: it is not just the reporting on the 
protest itself (visibility), but also the fact that it triggers further media attention 
(resonance in Koopmans’ terms) for the issue at stake that leads protest to affect the 
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political agenda. There are some rare empirical examples in the literature of total 
mediation of protest effects, but not regarding the role of the media. Costain and 
Majstorovic (1994), for example, tested to what extent the number of passed bills 
regarding women’s issues went up as a consequence of protest events by the 
women’s movements in the U.S. from 1950 to 1986. The number of protest events 
has an indirect effect that fully runs via public opinion (Burstein 2003; also McAdam 
and Su 2002 find an mediating effect of public opinion; see also Uba 2009 for a 
review of the studies using public opinion as an intermediary variable). Walgrave and 
Vliegenthart (2012) offer one of the only studies directly testing the media’s 
intermediary role. They find that, from 1993-2000 in Belgium, mass media coverage 
only partially mediated the effect of protest on parliament and government. Since 
the literature is indecisive, we posit that the media agenda mediates the effect of 
news coverage of protest and do not hypothesize about whether this mediation is 
partial or full. 
H2: The agenda effect of news coverage of protest on parliamentary 
questioning is mediated by general (non-protest) media coverage. 
 
Our second aim in this study is to explore the role of the political context in which 
the protest occurs and the effects this context has on the agenda impact of protest. 
One of the major theories in the field of social movements and protest is the well-
known ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS) approach (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 
1995; Tarrow 1998). Its main tenet is that the way social movements and their 
actions develop, is affected by the political context in which these actions take place. 
In countries with a favorable opportunity structure the movement sector is active 
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and strong, in countries with an unfavorable structure movements are weak and 
passive. Amenta and colleagues (2010, p. 295) emphasize that what makes protest 
happen, is not the same as what makes it successful (but see Soule and King 2006, p. 
1881). Still, the literature on social movement outcomes abounds with (case) studies 
showing that the political context, and thus in a broader perspective the entire 
political system, matters for political outcomes. For 18 of the 54 movements 
recorded in the studies analyzed in Amenta et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, the partisan 
context in which the protest is staged moderates the protest effect. Indeed, quite 
some scholars have argued that long-standing features of political systems—existing 
institutions, policies and electoral rules—have an important effect on the success 
chances of challengers (Amenta et al. 2002; Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2002). 
Since our study only contains six countries, we cannot test a variety of 
potentially interesting political system features; we are lacking analytical power on 
the country level. We focus on just one of the key distinctions between different 
political systems that has been made in the political science literature and that can 
be argued to have a profound impact on the position of social movements. This 
distinction is between ‘majoritarian’ democracies on the one hand and ‘consensus’ 
democracies on the other hand. Arend Lijphart showed in several seminal studies 
(1984, 1989, 1999) that Western democracies can be classified to belong to one of 
the two types, with only a limited number of countries having a hybrid form. These 
two types of democracies follow a clearly distinct rationale, with the majoritarian 
system based on the notion of effective and accountable government, while the 
consensus system is centered around the idea of inclusiveness and 
representativeness. Lijphart’s classification is based on two dimensions that capture 
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a wide variety of political and electoral system characteristics. The first dimension is 
what he calls the ‘executive-parties’ one and captures several (related) 
characteristics that capture the power distribution in the institutional system, such 
as electoral system (plurality versus proportional representation), concentration of 
executive power (composition of cabinets, one- party versus multi-party) and the 
number of parties (de facto two or multiple). The second dimension is the ‘unitary-
federal’ one and focuses on the level of decentralization of power and includes 
characteristics such as centralized versus decentralized government, (strong) 
bicameralism and the unwritten versus written (and rigid) constitutions. The 
distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy is very general and 
multiple suggestions for expansion or modification have been proposed in the 
literature. Vatter (2009), for example, suggests a third dimension: ‘top-to-bottom’ 
democracy, comprising of type of cabinet government and strength of direct 
democracy. This third dimension results in a further refinement in the classification 
of countries that have a consensus democracy. 
We contend, however, that the Lijphart’s initial distinction between 
consensus versus majoritarian democracies is a useful one to start our exploration of 
the moderating effects of political contexts, since it captures the difference between 
countries with a lot of institutional opportunities to voice a wide range of (also 
deviating) opinions and claims versus countries with considerably less institutional 
opportunities to do so. Adding a further refinement among consensus democracies, 
i.e. by treating Switzerland as a prototypical case of a ‘direct democratic power 
sharing democracy’ (Vatter 2009: 145), would not substantially alter our 
argumentation: the larger opportunities to voice opinions and claims are also 
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present (and arguably even more) in an institutional arrangement with a central 
place for direct democracy such as in Switzerland (that we already classify as a 
consensus democracy below) (Kriesi and Wisler 1996). 
The position of social movements and consequently also their potential 
impact on media is inherently different in those two systems, we argue. We expect 
that the impact of protest (coverage) on the general media agenda is smaller in 
consensus systems. In those contexts, protest issues are likely to be more 
adequately represented in parliament, since consensus democracies have a higher 
number of parties in parliament and government arguably a higher chance that 
movements’ claims and points of view are shared by and resonate with at least some 
of the political parties represented in parliament (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 2004). They 
are likely to bring those claims forward and as a consequence reach the mass media 
before they actually lead to protest. In line with the classical political opportunity 
structure theory (e.g. Kitschelt 1986), more parties in general and more parties in 
government in particular make for a more inclusive polity in which more issues gain 
access to the political agenda. Issues that gain political attention also get media 
attention (Vliegenthart et al. 2016). So, in such systems also the media agenda can 
be argued to be more inclusive reacting more responsively to new or marginal issues 
that gain momentum in society. Protest is less instrumental in shifting the media 
agenda as the agenda might in many instances already have shifted before the 
protest came about. In contrast, in more closed political systems with less adequate 
representation and allies for social movements in parliament, a protest shock might 
be needed before the media start to include new issues on the agenda; this implies 
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that the effect of the protest agenda on the media agenda is larger in majoritarian 
systems. Hence our third hypothesis: 
H3: The agenda effect of news coverage of protest on general (non-protest) 
media coverage is larger in majoritarian democracies compared to consensus 
democracies. 
Figure 1 below summarizes the causal model the study draws upon. It displays the 
direct effect arrow from media coverage of protest to politics (H1), the mediating 
arrow of media coverage of protest to general (non-protest) media coverage and of 
general (non-protest) media coverage to parliamentary questioning (H2), and the 
moderating arrow from the type of democracy to the mediation path (H3). Our 
moderated mediation model thus suggests that the type of democracy impacts the 
first step of the mediation process, i.e. from protest to media. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The following countries and periods are included in our analyses: the Netherlands 
(1995-2011), Spain (1996-2011), the United Kingdom (1997-2008), Switzerland 
(1995-2003) and France (1995-2005). The countries are partly selected because of 
the availability of data—we mentioned that the absence of comparative work is 
mainly due to data limitations and for this study we had to rely on a combination of 
existing data sources as well. Yet, they are all West-European democratic countries 
with a tradition of protest, free media, elections and accountable government. 
Moreover, they represent different political systems and vary on the crucial 
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contextual variable of interest, i.e. the democratic system. Additionally, for Belgium 
(1999-2010), we have similar data, only our protest data do not stem from a content 
analysis of media, but directly from police records. Therefore we conduct separate 
analyses for this country to test in more detail whether it is indeed mainly covered 
protests that drive the media and political agendas, or whether actual protest (also 
not covered in the media) does this as well. 
We rely on the databases of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) to assess 
the protest (coverage) agenda, mass media and political agendas in the six countries 
(http://www.comparativeagendas.info/; which also includes links to individual 
country sites and datasets). As stated before, we look at parliamentary questions. 
For the Netherlands, we have the written parliamentary questions (roughly 30% 
random sample), for Belgium oral questions and interpellations, for Spain oral 
questions, for the UK we use (oral) Prime Minister’s Questions, for Switzerland 
written questions and for France oral questions. While the role and function of 
parliamentary questions differs across countries (Wiberg 1995), we selected for each 
country that type of questions that is as equivalent as possible and that has enough 
variation. A total number of 62,312 parliamentary questions is included in the 
analyses. 
For the media agenda, we coded front page coverage in national newspapers 
for all six countries. For the Netherlands, NRC Handelsblad and de Volkskrant (13% 
sample) were coded, for Belgium De Standaard, for Spain El Pais and El Mundo, for 
the UK the Times (only Wednesdays are coded) [1], for Switzerland Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung and for France Le Monde. A total of 157,707 stories is included in the 
analyses. 
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All this material is coded according to the major policy categories of the 
Comparative Agendas Project. In all analyses and for all agendas, we use the relative 
share of attention devoted to those categories per month. The unit of analysis is thus 
the proportion of attention devoted to a certain issue on a certain agenda in a given 
point in time in each of the countries. 
To assess the protest agenda and its issue content, we rely on protest event 
analysis (PEA), a form of quantitative content analysis of media coverage. In doing 
so, we follow a long-standing tradition in research on social movements and 
contentious politics (for reviews, see: Koopmans & Rucht, 2002; Hutter, 2014a). PEA 
aims at describing protest events so as to allow for cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analyses. Compared to survey data, the other primary source for tracing the 
development of protest behavior, PEA is far better suited to measure the issues of 
protest, and this is the key variable of interest in agenda-setting research. 
More precisely, we rely on protest event data collected by Kriesi et al. (2012) 
for all countries except Belgium. These data are an updated and extended version of 
the data used by Kriesi et al. (1995) to study new social movements in Western 
Europe. The data itself comes from one national quality newspaper per country; only 
Monday editions were consulted. [2] This resulted in a dataset of 4,925 protest 
events in the five countries, involving around 49 million participants. The 
newspapers covered are The Guardian (UK), Le Monde (France), NRC Handelsblad 
(Netherlands), El Pais (Spain), and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland). The choice for 
Monday editions was dictated not only by the necessity to reduce the work of 
collecting a large number of events over a long period of time, but also because the 
Monday edition covers events during the weekend. Since protest activities tend to 
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be concentrated on weekends the dataset includes a high proportion of all protest 
events occurring during the period under study. All events covered in the Monday 
edition were coded, including those taking place one week before or after the 
publication date. That is why around twenty-five per cent of all coded events 
occurred during weekdays. 
PEA generally, and Kriesi et al.’s sampling strategy more specifically, has been 
the objects of criticism in the literature and researchers still disagree on how 
problematic the selection bias of newspaper data actually is. No one would claim 
that the events covered in the Monday editions of a national newspaper are a 
representative sample of all protests taking place in a given country. However, the 
factors that predict whether news media cover a protest event or not have been 
empirically assessed. These are event characteristics (mainly size and violence), the 
type of media outlet, and issue characteristics (mainly media attention cycles)(see: 
Earl et al., 2004; Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005). In general, the studies report the 
strongest effects for event characteristics. As Rucht and Neidhardt (1998, p. 76) 
stated, “In the case of very large events, as in cases of violent demonstrations leading 
to significant damage to property and/or injuries, we can expect a total coverage 
even when using only one national newspaper.” 
Since we cannot totally avoid biases and are rather interested in trends and 
differences, the present data is based on the idea of making the bias “as systematic 
as possible” (Koopmans 1995, p. 271). The selected newspapers are comparable. 
They were chosen with respect to six criteria: continuous publication throughout the 
research period, daily publication, high quality, comparability with regard to political 
orientation (none is very conservative or extremely left-wing), coverage of the entire 
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national territory, and similar selectivity when reporting on protest events. While the 
cross-national and longitudinal stability in the patterns of selection bias is still a 
contested topic, recent studies show that the sampling strategy used here scores 
well in comparison to more encompassing strategies of data collection (see Giugni 
2004; McCarthy et al. 2008; Hutter 2014b). Most important, the results show that 
the national ebbs and flows of protest mobilization in general and of individual 
issues more specifically are traced accurately with this sampling strategy. 
In the protest event analysis data employed in this paper initially 103 protest 
‘goals’ were identified. These goals were recoded by the authors to fit the CAP major 
issue categories. The recoded goals fall only in 17 different CAP categories (16 for 
Spain and the United Kingdom that excludes immigration as a major category). [3] 
These 17 categories are used in the analyses and are listed in table 1 below. 
Comparable to the media and the political data, our media-protest coverage 
measures gauge the relative share of protest events covered in the media that are 
devoted to an issue in a given country during a given month. 
For Belgium, a separate protest dataset was collected. In this case, data come 
from police records and are coded directly according to the major CAP categories. 
These data were thus collected fully independently from media coverage. We use 
the same 17 categories as for the other countries for Belgium. Additionally, we use a 
key word search on the full-text newspaper articles in the media dataset to 
determine whether an article refers to protest activities. We use this selection of 
newspaper articles to construct an alternative measure for the protest agenda as 
covered by the media in Belgium, using relative shares of attention to each issue as 
scores. 
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To test our hypotheses, we ran two sets of regression models, with media 
and parliament as dependent variables and each of the other agendas and protest as 
the independent variables. More precisely, we rely on country-level pooled random-
effects time-series models, with months nested in issue categories. We rely on 
monthly level analyses, because (a) we assume influences take place at relatively 
short time intervals (within a month) and (b) lower aggregation levels would result in 
too low values and too many zeros on the main variables. To deal with issue-level 
heterogeneity (some issues receive structurally more attention than others) and 
serial correlation, we include a lagged dependent variable in each of our models. [4] 
To further account for the fact that observations not only are temporally dependent, 
but are also nested in panels (country-issue combinations), we use ordinary least 
squares estimations with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). To 
predict newspaper coverage, we use both media-protest and parliamentary 
questions. For parliamentary questions, we use protest and newspaper coverage. All 
independent variable are lagged. For the media-protest agenda, we use the average 
score of the previous month and two months ago. Here, we follow the logic that this 
type of signals sometimes takes more time to spill-over to other agendas (see 
Walgrave et al, 2008 for a similar logic). We test one-lag, and two- and three-lag 
averages, and the models using a two-lag average outperform the others. Note that 
by using lags, we are likely to miss short-term influences from protest on media and 
politics that take place within single months, because we cannot be sure about the 
causal direction. It is not unthinkable, and would actually be in line with previous 
findings (e.g. Koopmans and Olzak 2004) that protest is also affected by newspaper 
coverage—and possibly indirectly by parliamentary activity. Additionally, we also 
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test for reversed causality and explore whether the media-protest agenda is also 
affected by parliamentary questions and general media coverage. Here, we rely on 
the notion of Granger causality: a variable x Granger-causes a variable y if the 
prediction of y improves when including past value(s) of x compared to a model that 
only includes past value(s) of y. In regular time series, Granger-causality is most 
commonly tested in a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis (Vliegenthart, 2014), 
where effects of both x on y and y on x are tested. In the case of pooled time series 
analysis, a similar logic can be applied (Hood et al., 2006). Here, we choose to 
straightforwardly test the effect of the lagged parliamentary questions in a similar 
manner as the reversed effect is tested and also investigate whether the effect is 
mediated by media coverage (see below). 
For the parliamentary questions, we run the main effects model with and 
without media coverage as an independent variable to test whether media indeed 
mediates protest effects. 
To test whether effects of protest differ across party systems, we use a 
dummy variable that distinguishes between countries with a majoritarian system 
(score 1) on the one hand (France, Spain and the United Kingdom) and countries 
with a consensus system on the other hand (the Netherlands and Switzerland).  
To test mediation, we use a Sobel-test that indicates whether the product of 
the effect of protest on media and media on parliament is significant. Furthermore, 
we explore whether the size of the effect the direct effect of protest on politics is 
reduced when the media is included as an explanatory variable (see Baron and 
Kenny, 1986). In the online appendix we present an additional analysis, based on 
bootstrapping procedures, to test the robustness of our findings. 
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We replicate all analyses including one additional control variable: the 
legislative agenda. It is likely that the other agendas respond to legislation that is 
proposed or passed in parliament. The operationalization of the legislative agenda 
variable is discussed in the online appendix. 
Before we show results in the next section, we present descriptive statistics 
of the variables of interest. Table 1 reports the average share of attention for each 
issue on all agendas we are interested in here: protest news coverage, media, and 
parliamentary questions. The total number of observations (N) per issue is the 
number of months times the countries. Note that we do not have similar numbers of 
observations in all countries due to different time periods and slightly different 
groupings of codes. For some issues the average attention is small—see for example 
the less than one per cent (0.7%) average attention for ‘foreign trade’ on the 
questions agenda—but for most issues it is above one per cent—with the highest 
average share for the issue of government operations in the newspapers (14.4%). 
Also note that the scores in table 1 do not sum op to 1 (or 100 percent), since some 
issues are left out of consideration, because they are not part of the recoded protest 
agenda. Furthermore, especially the protest and parliamentary agendas have 
months that no events are staged or questions are asked, for example due to 
parliamentary recess. In those months, all issues receive a score of ‘0’, lowering the 
overall means for those agendas. 
Table 1 about here 
One of the main claims put forward in this paper is that the media play a dual 
intermediary role when it comes to the political agenda power of protest. News 
media cover protest specifically and they cover the issues underlying the protest 
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more generally. More specific protest coverage leads to more general media 
coverage of the issues underlying the protest. In order to be able to sort these two 
effects out, it is important to assess the independence of media coverage of protest 
and media coverage more generally. First, protest codings have been done 
independently from the media coding. Second, only a very small portion of the 
media stories about an issue contain coverage of protest events. Though the data 
sources are only partly overlapping, we have almost 5,000 protest events and more 
than 150,000 newspaper articles included in the analysis. Third, the newspapers 
used for protest and for general coverage differ in many of the countries and much 
of the media coding is based only on front-page coverage, while the protest coding 
also uses the other parts of the newspapers. So, the overlap between media stories 
about protest regarding an issue and coverage of the issue itself is small. Finally, the 
literature on selection bias indicates that characteristics of a protest event itself (i.e., 
size and violence) are by far the most important predictors of media coverage and 
clearly outweigh the effect of external issue attention cycles (e.g., McCarthy et al. 
1996, p. 494). 
Furthermore, we can use the Belgian data—in which protest was recorded 
directly from police archives without relying on media accounts—as a comparison to 
further examine the possible dependence of the protest coverage and the general 
media coverage measures. We run simple bivariate correlations between protest 
(coverage) and the two other variables of interest for each country separately. An 
endogeneity problem would be apparent if the media-protest correlation in Belgium 
would be much lower than in the other countries. Table 2 presenting the results, 
shows that this is not the case. There are two countries (Netherlands and UK) where 
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the media-protest correlation is even lower than in Belgium and the correlation for 
Belgium is only a bit lower than the average correlation. This finding yields indirect 
evidence of the fact that we can use general media coverage as an independent 
intermediary variable in our analyses.  
Table 2 about here 
 
RESULTS 
 
In order to later tackle the question whether parliamentary questions are affected 
by media coverage of protest via the general media agenda, we first examine to 
what extent the mass media’s general issue agenda is influenced by protest—this is 
the first step in our mediation model. Table 3 records the results of the analyses with 
newspapers’ share of attention for each issue in each month in each of the five 
countries as the dependent variable. 
Table 3 about here 
Model 1 suggests that media coverage’s distribution of attention over issues is 
strongly affected by the media’s own past agenda, meaning that media attention is 
highly path-dependent. Furthermore, media also react to parliamentary questions 
asked in the previous months. This is what one can expect. The result of interest in 
table 3 (model 1) is the coefficient tapping the impact from past protests covered in 
the media on the general media attention for the protest issue in the current month. 
The effect is significant. This means that with a one percent increase in news 
coverage of protests relating to a particular issue, attention to the issue in the 
general newspaper coverage will increase by .014 per cent in the two following 
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months. This is not a large effect, but protest news coverage shifts substantially from 
month to month with sometimes large segments of the protest agenda devoted to 
just one or two issues. For example, a one standard deviation increase (9.2 per cent) 
in the news coverage of protests results in a 0.13 per cent increase in the share of 
general news coverage on the same issue. Furthermore, this effect is above and 
beyond the effect of the newspaper’s own past attention to the issue, as well as the 
effects of parliamentary questions. A separate analysis for Belgium largely confirms 
the findings of this analysis (see online appendix, table A4).  
We now examine H1 stating that protest coverage exerts influence on the 
questions in parliament. Table 4 contains the evidence. Again, we see strong 
autoregressive components in all analyses; a lot of the variance in issue attention in 
questions is accounted for by the parliamentary attention to issues in the preceding 
months. What is left over is to some extent explained by protest coverage. The 
effect of protest coverage in Model 1 in table 4 is significant. When more protest 
events covered by the media take place, there is more attention to the underlying 
issue in the questions MPs ask to the cabinet ministers. A one per cent increase in 
media-protest attention results in a .013 per cent increase on the parliamentary 
attention on the same issue. In absolute terms, this effect is comparable to the 
effect of the protest agenda on the media agenda. In sum, H1 receives support from 
the data: protest has an effect on what politicians are talking about in parliament. 
Table 4 about here 
Model 2 in table 5 tests H2 considering the mediating role of general media 
coverage. Newspapers do affect questions in a significant way. This is entirely in line 
with what we know from media and political agenda studies; the effect is quite 
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substantial (.184). When general media coverage is added to the model the effect of 
protest coverage on questions entirely disappears. In other words, the effect of 
general media coverage fully wipes out the direct effect of protest coverage. This 
effect becomes insignificant and even slightly negative (-.004). A formal test for 
mediation is conducted and this Sobel test indicates that the indirect effect is 
significant (4.458, p<.001). Knowing from table 3 (model 1) that newspapers’ general 
issue coverage is partially driven by preceding protest, we have a clear case of full 
mediation. The entire effect of protest coverage on the political agenda runs via 
mass media, there is no additional direct effect net of general news coverage. The 
findings thus give support to H2: the mechanism through which protest coverage has 
an impact on political elites is by increasing general media attention to the issue at 
stake. Again, separate analyses for Belgium are in line with those findings (see online 
appendix, table A5). 
We now turn to H3 stating that the size of the effect of protest coverage on 
media, and this indirectly on parliament, would be dependent on key features of the 
political context in which it occurs, i.e. the institutional openness as captured by the 
distinction between consensus and majoritarian systems. The effect of protest 
coverage on the general media agenda is indeed dependent on the democratic 
system: in majoritarian democracies, the impact of protest on the media agenda is 
larger. In table 3 (model 2) the interaction effect of protest coverage and the 
majoritarian democracy dummy is positive (.012) and significant. Figure 2 plots the 
predicted values for general newspaper attention affected by protest for 
majoritarian democracies and consensus democracies. We see that the protest 
agenda has a larger effect in the context of majoritarianism (steeper line). However, 
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this effect is small and while the prediction for majoritarian countries falls outside 
the confidence intervals of the prediction for countries with a consensus democracy 
for the whole range of values, the difference between the two increases only slowly 
with higher levels of protest attention. This finding underlines the importance of 
embedding the protest-agenda linkage in its political context and thus offers 
tentative support for hypothesis 3, but also indicates that this effect is small. 
Another indication of the small size of the effect is limited increase in the explained 
variance (R squared) when adding the interaction term (from .6840 to .6841). 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Also the moderated mediation model that relies on bootstrapping offers support for 
hypothesis 3 (see online appendix, additional analysis 4). Finally, for the main 
analyzes, we re-estimated the models per country. While we do not find significant 
effects for every individual country, the pooled results as presented below are 
clearly not driven by a single country outlier. In none of the countries do we find 
significant effects that run in the opposite direction compared to the pooled model. 
Also, the results with legislation as an additional control variable confirm our 
findings: adding this variable does not alter the findings in any substantial way (see 
Tables A6-A9 in the Appendix). 
Finally, we also tested the reversed causal chain by looking at the direct and 
indirect impact of parliamentary questions on protest coverage. The results in table 
A1 (online appendix) suggest that first, protest is responsive to parliamentary 
questions: the effect is positive and significant and the model improves when the 
lagged value of protest is added as an explanatory variable (Chi2=9.33, df=1, p<.01). 
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Second, also here, full mediation is present: protesters do not directly respond to 
parliamentary activity, but use the media as their source of information. The direct 
effect of parliamentary questions (Model 1) is reduced to almost 0 when newspaper 
coverage is added (Model 2). The indirect effect of parliamentary questions via 
newspaper coverage (see Model 1, table 3 and Model 2, table A1) is positive and 
significant (Sobel test =5.089, p<.001). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Does protest, via its coverage in the media, lead to a subsequent increase of 
attention to the underlying issue on the political agenda? Based on longitudinal, 
standardized agenda data in six European countries we can answer the questions we 
started with in a positive manner. When media coverage of protest relating to an 
issue goes up, so does the ensuing attention in parliamentary questions. We added 
to the current understanding of how protest matters by showing that protest’s 
impact is fully mediated in a dual way by mass media coverage: protest leads to 
specific media coverage of the protest events, this leads to increasing general media 
attention to the issue at stake and this media attention, in turn, leads to increased 
political attention in parliament. We did not find any proof of direct effects of 
protest on the parliamentary agenda (except for in Belgium). The media are thus a 
key factor in understanding the agenda setting influence of protest. If a social 
movement wants to bring about policy change, the first step is to get political 
attention for its issue (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), for example through staging 
protest events. This will only happen when the media are ‘on board’ and pick up the 
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protest by devoting more attention to the specific issue as well. Our results support 
Koopmans’ (2004) theoretical claims on the importance of mass media for protest to 
matter. In addition, they are consistent with Giugni’s (2004) findings that social 
movements have little, if any, direct impact on policy. The protest effect found, is to 
some extent moderated by system-level features: the indirect effect of protest via 
media is stronger in majoritarian countries. 
This study made a first, and we think an important, step forward in the study 
of the agenda setting power of protest in a cross-issue, cross-country and 
longitudinal way. However, it represents only a preliminary step in further exploring 
the precise contingencies of protest influence on political issue attention. The 
analyses we presented here were based on pooled data and there are a lot of things 
going on underneath the very broad and general patterns we found. Coming back to 
our initial assumption about the informational role of protest, further studies should 
more carefully disentangle the signals sent by the protestors as well as the receiver’s 
side. Regarding the protest, we only assessed the frequency of the protest coverage, 
but protest is sometimes said to be only effective when it is disruptive. The 
ideological color of the protest—e.g. is it left or right wing?—may matter as well, 
and so does the concrete issue at stake. We expect there to be differences between 
issues with some issues more prone to protest effects than others (e.g., valence 
issues more than positional issues). The sponsors of the protest, the type of social 
movement organization and its strength, may—in line with resource mobilization 
theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977)—play a role as well. Regarding the receiver of the 
protest signal, one of the next steps is to disaggregate to the party level and test 
whether some parties are more reactive to protest than others—are left-wing 
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parties more sensitive to trade union protest, for example? Finally, there is much 
more to say about the six countries that are covered here. To start the discussion, 
we only took into account their rough classification as consensus or majoritarian 
democracies, which is a compound measure and captures what we believe is a key 
mechanism in how political contexts moderate the effects of protest on media, but 
based on a larger country sample one should disentangle the effects of specific 
institutional features. Moreover, the countries differ in other regards as well. Apart 
from general contextual factors emphasized in the POS literature, it may be 
interesting to pay more attention to the very particular questioning rules that 
differentiate the six legislatures’ reactions to protest. In sum: we have only scratched 
the surface, but our findings are promising. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
[1] Newspaper coding in the UK was limited due to constraints in resources. Every 
Wednesday was sampled in order that these were as close as possible to the session 
of prime minister's questions for a given week (which since 1997 has taken place at 
midday on Wednesdays). This ensured that our measure of media attention 
corresponded to the sampling point for parliamentary questions. 
 
[2] Since El Pais is also published on Sunday, we covered events reported in the 
Sunday and Monday edition of the newspaper. 
 
[3] To check whether this differential coding affected the findings, we re-analysed 
the data excluding the issues of immigration and integration, civil rights and liberties, 
and labor and employment. Results are reported in the online appendix (table A2 
and A3) and show that the exclusion of those issues do not alter the substantial 
results of the analyses. 
 
[4] There are several ways to deal with unit-level heterogeneity. The strictest one 
would include dummy variables for each country-issue combination, resulting in a 
fixed-effects model that has removed all issue and country level variance. We chose 
not to use a fixed effects analysis, since we are substantially interested in cross-
national differences. Furthermore, such an approach consumes a lot of degrees of 
freedom. A lagged dependent variable also accounts for (a large part of) 
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heterogeneity, since the previous value–that might differ substantially in average 
level across issues–is taken into account as an explanatory variable. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. Share (proportion) of attention for each issue per 
agenda across countries 
Issue N 
Protest 
(coverage) 
Newspapers Questions 
Macro economics 873 .0253 .0456 .0526 
Civil rights and liberties 873 .1520 .0443 .0281 
Health 873 .0354 .0399 .0777 
Agriculture and fishery 873 .0182 .0127 .0311 
Labor and employment 873 .0490 .0280 .0379 
Education 873 .0316 .0254 .0422 
Environment 873 .0529 .0125 .0301 
Energy 873 .0103 .0109 .0167 
Immigration and integration 548 .0871 .0166 .0313 
Transportation 873 .0448 .0332 .0663 
Law, crime and family  873 .0283 .1143 .0899 
Social welfare 873 .0186 .0081 .0337 
Comm. develop., planning, 873 .0104 .0087 .0228 
Defense 873 .0418 .0684 .0457 
Foreign trade 873 .0133 .0072 .0066 
International affairs and foreign 873 .0644 .0888 .0553 
Government operations 873 .1343 .1443 .0912 
Note. Immigration and integration are included in civil rights and liberties or labor 
and employment for Spain and United Kingdom. Scores do not sum op to 1 (or 100 
percent), since some issues are left out of consideration, because they are not part 
of the recoded protest agenda. Furthermore, especially the protest and 
parliamentary agendas have months that no events are staged or questions are 
asked, lowering overall means. 
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Table 2. Correlation between protest, newspapers and questions across six countries 
Country Newspapers Questions 
All .172*** .055*** 
Spain (protest coverage) .374*** .162*** 
France (protest coverage) .172*** -.016 
Switzerland (protest coverage) .163*** -.012 
Belgium (police) .097*** .056* 
United Kingdom (protest coverage) .064** .103*** 
Netherlands (protest coverage) .017 -.012 
Note. *p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Table 3. Predicting general newspaper coverage in five countries 
 Model 1 
Main effects 
Model 2 
Interaction effects 
Newspapers (t-1) .809*** (.013) .808*** (.013) 
Questions (t-1) .034*** (.006) .033*** (.006) 
Protest (coverage) (t-[1-2]) .014*** (.003) .007+ (.004) 
Majoritarian democracy .001** (.000) -.000 (.000) 
Protest (coverage) * majoritarian  .012* (.006) 
Constant .005*** (.001) .006*** (.001) 
R squared .6840 .6841 
Note. OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors; N=12,310 *p<.05; ** 
p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
  
Table 4. Predicting parliamentary questions in five countries 
 Model 1 
Main effects 
without media 
coverage 
Model 2 
Main effects 
with media 
coverage 
Questions (t-1) .363*** (.018) .319*** (.018) 
Newspaper (t-1)  .184*** (.012) 
Protest (t-[1-2]) .013** (.006) -.004 (.006) 
Majoritarian democracy -.006*** (.001) -.007*** (.001) 
Constant .032*** (.001) .027*** (.001) 
R squared .1385 .1636 
Note. OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors; N=12,310, * p<.05; ** 
p<.01; *** p<.001 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Causal Model 
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Figure 2. Effects of protest (coverage) on newspaper attention 
 
Note. All existing values for the protest agenda (range 0-1) are depicted. 
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